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ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court's Failure To Grant Brown's Motion To Continue Trial And
Vacate Scheduling Order And Motion To Compel Prior To Deciding ChickFil-A's Motion For Summary Judgment Are Properly Before This Court And
Should Be Reviewed For An Abuse of Discretion,
Chick-Fil-A argues that Brown did not properly preserve the issues as to the trial

court's holding that her motion to continue trial and vacate scheduling order was moot
and denial of her motion to compel discovery. These issues were raised to the trial court,
briefed by the parties and set for hearing. See: Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission,
945 P.2d 125 at 129-130 (Utah App. 1997) (to preserve a substantive issue for appeal,
a party must first raise the issue before the trial court, have the requisite legal authority
to support the argument, and provide the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue's
merit). As such, these issues are properly before this court for review.
Pursuant to Rules 37 and 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Brown timely filed
a motion to continue trial and motion to compel discovery.

(R. 299-300; 325-327.)

These motions were supported by memorandums of points and legal authorities and set
for hearing along with Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment. (R. 232-252; R.
304-324; 402-403.) The trial court heard argument on the motion to continue and the
motion to compel at the same time it heard argument on the motion for summary
1

judgment. The trial court refused to rule on Brown's motion to continue and motion to
compel, but rather granted summary judgment in favor of Chick-Fil-A. (Transcript of
Hearing, P. 52.) As a matter of law, the trial court abused its discretion when it refused
to rule on Brown's motion to compel and found that the motion to continue trial and
vacate scheduling order was moot.
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes the trial court to grant a
continuance upon good cause shown or as justice may require. In reviewing the trial
court's decision, the appellate court should, "examine the reasonableness of the exercise
of that discretion . . . [and] should not reverse the ruling of the trial court absent a
showing that the latter abused its discretion." Bairas v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 375 at 377378 (Utah 1962).
Brown presented the trial court with four (4) grounds for continuing the trial: 1)
Chick-Fil-A failed and refused to answer discovery; 2) Because Chick-Fil-A frustrated
discovery, Brown was not able to fully investigate her claims; 3) Brown's counsel was
force to withdraw unexpectedly; and 4) Brown's new counsel had a conflicting trial
scheduled. Brown made the good cause showing necessary to justify continuation of the
trial. See: Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) (when counsel has made
timely objections, given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the

2

trial date changed . . . it [is] an abuse of discretion not to grant the continuance.) As
such, the trial court abused its discretion by not continuing the trial and vacating the
scheduling order.
At the same time, Brown filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Rule
37(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The basis of Brown's argument was that she first
propounded interrogatories on August 26, 1996.l These interrogatories consisted of six
(6) questions. (A. 1- 6.) Chick-Fil-A failed to answer within thirty (30) days as is
required by Rule 31, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon inquiry from Brown, ChickFil-A indicated that it was in the process of answering the interrogatories and would
forward the answers as soon as possible. Importantly, Chick-Fil-A never refused to
answer these interrogatories. Chick-Fil-A finally answered Brown's interrogatories on
March 24, 1997.
responsive.

(R. 168-173.)

(A. 7-12.)

The answers provided were incomplete and non-

As such, Chick-Fil-A did not fulfil its duty to respond to

discovery and Brown moved to compel on April 14, 1997. (R. 325-327; 232-252.)

brown's first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents were
served on Chick-Fil-A, Inc., a Georgia Corporation on October 30, 1995. (R. 19-20; 2930.) On February 9, 1996 Chris Glover dba Chick-Fil-A of Fashion Place was
substituted as a defendant in lieu of Chick-Fil-A, Inc., a Georgia Corporation. (R. 4849.) Brown re-propounded her interrogatories and request for production to Chris Glover
dba Chick-Fil-A on August 26, 1996. (R. 97-98.)

3

It is a well established rule of law that, "[a] [djefendant may not ignore with
impunity the requirements of Rules 33 and 34, and the necessity to respond within thirty
(30) days." W. W. Gardner v. Park West Village, 568 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1977) (upholding
the trial courts grant of summary judgment against the defendant for the defendant's
failure to respond to discovery.)

At the hearing before the trial court Chick-Fil-A

erroneously argued, and the court erroneously held that Brown should have moved to
compel discovery earlier. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ChickFil-A, given the pending motion to compel, was a clear abuse of discretion.
The motion to continue trial and the motion to compel were properly before the
trial court. They were properly briefed and scheduled for hearing. As such, these issues
are properly before this court on appeal. The trial court abused its discretion by failing
and refusing to rule on these motions and concluding that these motions were moot in
light of its grant of summary judgment. As such, the trail court abused its discretion by
not granting these motions.
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Plaintiff's Rule 56(f)
Motion To Continue.
In response to Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment, Brown timely filed

a motion for continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, along
with the supporting affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash. (R. 330-331; 393-396.). The trial
4

court denied Brown's Rule 56(f) motion and proceeded to hear, and grant, Chick-Fil-A's
motion for summary judgment.
Rule 56(0, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just.
There are two considerations for granting a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f):
First, was there sufficient discovery prior to the motion for summary judgment, and, if
so, was it afforded an appropriate response? Second, is the discovery sought by the party
opposing summary judgment for purely speculative facts i.e., are they on a "fishing
expedition?" Cox v. Winters, 678 P. 2d 311 at 313-314 (Utah 1984).
It is well established that, "when a party timely presents an affidavit under Rule
56(f) . . . the trial court's discretion is invoked." Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.
2d 1241 at 1243 (Utah 1994). And, a trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for
continuance will be reversed if it exceeds the limits of reasonability. Id. at 1243.
The facts of this case establish that Brown commenced discovery prior to the
discovery cut-off and that Chick-Fil-a did not "afford" it an appropriate response. The
information Brown sought in this discovery was material to the issues raised in summary

5

judgement.

As such, the trial court's denial of Brown's Rule 56(f) motion for

continuance (when reviewed in light of the previously filed motion to continue trial and
vacate scheduling order and motion to compel) exceeds the limits of reasonability and as
such this court should reverse the summary judgment.
1.

Summary Judgment Was Improper Because Chick-Fil-A Had Not
Completed The Outstanding Discovery And The Delay Precluded Brown
From Fully Investigating Her Claims.

Chick-Fil-A argues that all the requested discovery was provided well before the
discovery cut-off and as such, the trial court properly concluded that Brown had adequate
time to complete her discovery prior to summary judgment. This argument is Chick-FilA's attempt to distract this court from the fact — clearly established in the record — that
Chick-Fil-A did not timely respond to interrogatories and requests for production of
documents. And, when it did respond, its answers were incomplete and non-responsive.
In its brief, Chick-Fil-A admits that there was "some delay" in responding to
Brown's interrogatories. See: Brief of Appellees, P. 8. The delay was at least six (6)
months.2 In fact, Chick-Fil-A answered the interrogatories on March 24, 1997 ~ one

2

Chick-Fil-A delayed answering the interrogatories for approximately seventeen (17)
months from the time of fist service. See: Footnote 1.
6

week before filing its motion for summary judgment.3 (R. 168-173.) And, when ChickFil-A finally did respond, its answers were incomplete and nonresponsive.4 (A. 7-12.)
Given that Chick-Fil-A's answers were incomplete and nonresponsive, it still
argues that "discovery was complete." This inconsistency is obvious. How can one that
does not comply with Rules 33 and 34, argue that discovery is complete? By definition,
discovery cannot be complete if answers are not provided.

Case law dictates that

summary judgment cannot be granted if discovery is incomplete. See: Cox v. Winters,
678

P. 2d 311 at 314 (Utah 1984) (summary judgment is not proper before the

nonmoving party has carried the already-begun discovery to completion); Auerbach ys Inc.
v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 at 377 (Utah 1977) (summary judgment is premature because
the nonmoving party's discovery is not yet complete); Drysdayle v. Ford Motor Co., 947

3

It is interesting to note that the trial court never asked Chick-Fil-A to explain why
its discovery responses were delayed or why the answers it ultimately provided were
incomplete.
4

For example, Interrogatory No. 3 asks for the name, address and telephone number
of the manager or crew chief who was in charge of the restaurant on premises on January
18, 1994 between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Chick-Fil-A's answer, "[t]he identity of the
manager or crew chief who was in charge of the restaurant on January 18, 1994 is
unknown at this time." Similarly, Interrogatory No. 4 asks for the name, address and
telephone number [of] all employees who distributed samples of chicken in the Fashion
Place Mall between he hours of 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on January 18, 1994. ChickFil-A's answer, "the identify of the employee who distributed samples of chicken is not
known."
7

P. 2d 678 at 680 (Utah 1997) (prior to the completion of discovery, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the nonmoving party will be able to sustain its claims and as such
summary judgment should be denied); and Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 801
P.2d 144 at 154 (Utah 1990) (summary judgment is premature since the nonmoving party
might be able, through additional discovery, prove different theories of recovery.)
Chick-Fil-A sought to benefit from its non-compliance with the discovery rules in
this case.

Chick-Fil-A knew when it filed for summary judgment that its discovery

responses were not complete. By granting summary judgment, the trial court sanctioned
Chick-Fil-A's non-compliance with the discovery rules. This clearly contravenes the
existing case law and the purpose of Rule 56(f).
2.

The Information Set Forth In The Affidavit In Support Of Rule 56(f)
Motion To Continue Was Material To Summary Judgment.

Brown filed an affidavit setting forth the facts she needed to obtain from discovery.
(R. 393-396.) These facts were material to the issues raised on summary judgment. As
such, the trail court abused its discretion by denying Brown's Rule 56(f) motion to
continue and granting Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal Chick-Fil-A argues that the trial court denied the Rule 56(f) motion
because it found that none of the factual issues raised in the affidavit were material to
the summary judgment. Brief of Appellees, P. 12. The trial court did not make this

8

finding. Rather, the trial court found that the information sought was discoverable and
something that should have been provided. Transcript on Appeal, P. 8. The reason the
trial court did not grant the Rule 56(f) motion is because it concluded, "if [Brown]
wanted the information . . [she] had a lot of time to get it and that [she] did not pursue
the remedies that were available to [her] ."

Transcript on Appeal, P. 26. As is argued

above, the trial court improperly sanctioned Chick-Fil-A's misuse of the discovery
process by denying the pending motions, including the Rule 56(f) motion.
Brown's theory of recovery in this case is that the method,of operation i.e.,
offering samples of greasy chicken in the mall walkway, used by Chick-Fil-A was
inherently dangerous. In order to advance this theory, Brown needed to talk with the
employees that actually handed out the samples to learn how far into the mall they went,
if they were instructed to approach mall patrons, how often chicken samples were seen
on the floor, if they were instructed to clean the sampling area beyond the lease line, etc.
Theses facts — the facts necessary to establish the dangerous method of operation and to
rebut summary judgment -- were not before the court. As such, the court could not
assume they were true for the purposes of summary judgment. Rather, the trial court

9

simply dismissed the method of operation argument and granted summary judgment.5
This constitutes an abuse of discretion.
C.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When It Determined That This
Case Was Indistinguishable From Schnuphase.6
At the trial level Brown claimed that the method of operation Chick-Fil-A used to

sample its food was inherently dangerous. Specifically, Brown argued that passing out
samples of greasy chicken, on a toothpick, in a busy and crowded mall walkway created
a situation were it was reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties
would create a dangerous condition. (Transcript of Appeal, 44-45.) As such, Brown
argued that the controlling case was Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App.
1992). And that it was for the trier of fact to determine the reasonableness of Chick-FilA's method of operation. The trial court disregarded this argument and concluded, as
a matter of law, that Schnuphase was the controlling case. As such, the trial court
committed reversible error.

5

The trial court reasoned, "it seems to me that what [Brown is] inviting as material
genuine issue of fact has to do with how Chick-Fil-A was acting in handing out chicken,
and it seems to me [Chick-Fil-A's] position is that it doesn't matter; handing out food
is not inherently dangerous. Whatever the nature of the food is, the Supreme court is
telling us that that is not the kind of activity that is going to create liability." Transcript
of Appeal, P 4 8 .
6

Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996).
10

There are two theories of recovery in slip-and-fall cases.

The first involves

situations where there is a temporary hazard within the store that was not created by the
storeowner. Under this theory, the injured party must establish that the storeowner knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have know of the spill and had the
opportunity the clean it up.
The second theory of recovery is where the storeowner creates the dangerous
condition. Under this theory, the injured party does not need to establish notice since a
storeowner is deemed to have notice of the dangerous condition. Canfield at 1226.
In particular, "where the storeowner chooses a method of operation where it is reasonable
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition, an
injured party need not prove either actual or constructive knowledge of the specific
condition. Id. at 1226 citing De Weese v. 7. C Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P.
2d 898, 901 (1956).
In Canfield, a grocery store instituted a specialized marketing practice — they
displayed lettuce in the same box it arrived in from the farm i.e., the "farmers' pack."
Because the lettuce had not been trimmed, it was expectable that customers would remove
the outer leaves to examine the lettuce prior to purchasing it and, it was expectable that

11

some of the outer leaves would inadvertently end-up on the floor. It was not expected
that the customer would throw the outer leaves of the lettuce on the floor.
The grocer reasonably foresaw that the outer leaves would be removed and
reasonably foresaw that some of these leaves would inadvertently fall to the floor.
Knowing this, the grocer placed empty boxes around the display where customers could
dispose of these leaves. The trial court granted summary judgement for the grocery store
because the injured party had not established that the grocer had actual or constructive
notice of the lettuce leave which caused her fall.
Upon review, this Court reasoned:
[Wjhere the storeowner's method of operation creates a situation where it
is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create
a dangerous condition, an injured party need not prove either actual or
constructive knowledge of the specific condition. (Citations omitted). In
this type of case, notice is satisfied as a matter of law because the
storeowner is deemed to be informed of the dangerous condition since it
adopted the method of operation. (Emphasis added.)
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, this Court held:
Albertsons chose a method of displaying and offering lettuce for sale where it was
expected that third parties would remove and discard the outer leaves from heads
of lettuce they intended to purchase. It was reasonably foreseeable that under this
method of operation some leaves would fall or be dropped on the floor by
customers thereby creating a dangerous condition.
Canfield at 1226, 1227.

12

Chick-Fil-A relies on Schnuphase and argues that this is a typical sampling "spill"
case and that as such, Brown must establish that Chick-fil-A had noticed that this specific
piece of chicken was on the ground. In Schnuphase a customer slipped on ice cream that
had fallen near the deli section of the grocery store. The ice cream had been on the floor
for two to four minutes before the fall. The trial court granted summary judgement for
the grocery store. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning:
Schnuphase failed to provide evidence of the foreseeability of an inherently
dangerous condition. . . .7 While we do not limit the second class of cases
to only those operations which are permanently employed, inherent
dangerous and foreseeability remain essential elements of the claim.
(Emphasis added)
918 P.2dat479.
This is not the typical sampling case where the sampling takes place in a grocery
store and people are carrying their intended purchases around in a shopping cart. To the
contrary — in this case Chick-Fil-A selected method of operation where it went out into
a mall walkway to distributed chicken samples to shoppers.

These shoppers were

carrying their purchases — their hands were occupied. Chick-Fil-A purposefully timed
its sampling to coincide with the traffic at the mall - it placed an employee with greasy

7

The essential element for method of operation claims is that the condition created
by defendant is of such a character that defendant has or should have notice of the
inherently dangerous condition.
13

pieces of chicken on toothpicks in the mall walkway when the mall was its busiest. It
was expectable that shoppers would sample the chicken in the mall walkway. And, more
importantly, it was expectable that some of the chicken samples would be drop in the
mall walkway creating a dangerous condition for all shoppers. In fact Chick-Fil-A's
management was aware that spilled chicken, from the chicken sampling, ended up in the
mall walkway during busy periods. (R. 333-3335.) The "spill" was not a temporary
condition but rather a dangerous and foreseeable consequence of the method of operation
Chick-Fil-A selected to market its product. As such, the facts presented in this case fall
within the preview of Canfield.
Accordingly, Brown did not need to establish that Chick-Fil-A had notice of the
piece of chicken she fell on because, given the method of operation selected by Chick-FilA, notice was satisfied as a matter of law.

Thus, the remaining question was whether

or not Chick-Fil-A's method of operation was reasonable.

The determination of

reasonableness lies within the providence of the jury and precludes summary judgment.
De Weese at 90L
The trial court erroneously concluded that this case was indistinguishable from
Schnuphase — it used the wrong analysis and erroneously granted summary judgment.

14

This court should reverse the grant of summary judgment and allow the jury to determine
if Chick-Fil-A's method of operation was reasonable.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In this case, Brown clearly preserved for review the trial court's ruling that her
motion to continue trail and vacate scheduling order was moot and the denial of her
motion to compel discovery. Chick-Fil-A did not address these issues at all. As has
been argued above, the trial court abused its discretion by failing and refusing to rule on
these motions and concluding that these motions were moot in light of the pending motion
for summary judgment.
Before the trial court, Brown vigorously argued that discovery was incomplete due
to Chick-Fil-A's willful misuse of the rules.

Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the

discovery, Brown presented the trial court with facts and a theory to support her claim
and preclude summary judgment.

The trial court committed reversible error by

disregarding these facts and granting summary judgment. As such, Brown requests that

15

this case be reversed and remanded and that her case be presented to the trier of fact.
DATED this ^1^-day of September, 1998.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant

NANCY A. MISMASH
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3575 South Market Street, #206
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 966-8111
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE BROWN,

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES TO
DEFENDANT CHRIS GLOVER
dba CHICK-FIL-A

Plaintiff,
v.
CHRIS GLOVER dba CHICK-FIL-A
OF FASHION PLACE, HAHN
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a California
corporation dba HAHN COMPANY,

Civil No. 950905823PI

Defendants.

Judge

Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, hereby demands that defendant answer, under oath and in
writing, each interrogatory hereinafter set forth, and serve a
sworn copy of such answers upon the undersigned within forty-five
days after service hereof.
INTRODUCTION
1.

The word lfperson(s) " means all entities and, without

limiting the generality of the forgoing, includes natural persons,
joint

owners,

associations,

companies,

partnerships,

joint

ventures, corporations, trusts and estates;

1

recorded

2.

The word "document(s)" means all written, printed,

or

graphic

matter,

photographic

matter

or

sound

reproductions, however produced or reproduced, pertaining in any
manner to the subject matter indicated;
3.

The words "identify", "identity" and "identifi-

cation" when used with respect to a person or persons, means to
state the full name and present or last known residence and
business address of such person or persons, and, if a natural
person, his present or last known job title, and the name and
address of his present or last known employer;
4.

The words "identify", "identity" and "identifi-

cation" when used with respect to a document or documents, means
the date thereof, subject matter, name(s) of person(s) who wrote,
signed, initialed, dictated or otherwise participated

in the

creation of the same, the name(s) of the addressee or addressees
(if any) , and the name(s) and address (es) of each person or persons
who have possession, custody or control of said document or
documents.

If any such document was, or in existence, but is no

longer, in your possession, custody or control state the date and
manner of its deposition;
5.

The word "identify" when used with respect to a

conversation means to state:
a.

The time of such conversation;

b.

The place of such conversation;
2

2

c.

The identity of each person who participated
in or overheard such conversation;

d.

The substance of the conversation including
who said what;

e.

Whether any minutes, notes or memoranda were
kept, and if so, identify the custodian of
such documents.

6.

The word "you" or "your" means the defendant.

If

the defendant is a corporation, the words "you" or "your" shall
include agents and all other persons acting or purporting to act on
behalf of it or its predecessors, including all past or present
employees exercising discretion, making policy and making decisions
or participating in any function with respect to loans;
7.

The word "policy" means each rule, procedure, or

directive, formal or informal, and each common understanding or
course of conduct which was recognized as such by your employees or
other persons acting on your behalf, which was in effect at any
time during the period covered by these interrogatories;

INSTRUCTIONS
I.

When interrogatories contain separately numbered or

lettered paragraphs, each separately numbered or lettered paragraph
should be treated separately and a separate response furnished.

2.

If, in answering these interrogatories or any of

them, the party responding encounters any ambiguity in construing
either the interrogatory or a definition or instruction relevant to
the inquiry contained within the interrogatory, the party shall set
for the matter deemed "ambiguous" and set forth the construction
chosen or used in answering the interrogatory.
3.

If any information is requested by an interrogatory

on a calendar year basis, and the defendant's fiscal year differs
from the calendar year basis, it will be acceptable to plaintiff to
so state, identify the fiscal years involved, and supply the
information requested on a fiscal year basis if the information is
more readily available in that form.
4.

If the defendant exercises its option under Rule

33(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to produce business
records in lieu of responding to any interrogatory, the following
procedure is to be followed:
a.

In response to each such interrogatory, defendant
will

explain

why

the

burden

of

deriving

or

ascertaining the answer is substantially the same
for the parties serving the interrogatories as for
the party served, and then state the identity of
the records containing the answer.
b.

In producing such records, defendant will produce
such records separately and will designate the
4

interrogatory

or interrogatories

to which such

record responds, as well as the identification of
the

file(s)

from

which

the

documents

were

segregated.
51.

Wherever an interrogatory calls for the identity of

a document or non-written communication claimed by defendant to be
privileged, include the statement of the identity of such document
or non-written communication, the fact of such claim of privilege
and the basis for the assertion of such claim.
6.

Each of the following interrogatories is intended to

be a continuing interrogatory and plaintiffs hereby demand that in
the event, at any later date, the defendant obtains any additional
facts, or forms any conclusions, opinions or contentions different
from those set forth in their answers to such interrogatories;
defendant shall amend its answers to such interrogatories promptly
and sufficiently in advance of any trial to fully set forth such
differences.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1.:
position

all

persons

who

Identify by name, address and
assisted

in

answering

these

interrogatories.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2.:

Identify by name, address and

position those employees working at Chick-Fil-A on January 18,
1994.
5

INTERROGATORY NO. 3.:

Identify by name, address and

telephone number the manager or crew chief who was in charge of the
restaurant and on premises on January 18, 1994 between 10:00 a.m.
and 4:00 p.m.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4.:

Identify by name, address and

telephone number all employees who distributed samples of chicken
in the Fashion Place Mall between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 2:00
p.m. on January 18, 1994.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5.;

Identify

by

name,

address,

telephone number and title any Chick-Fil-A employee who has given
any recorded statement, made any written notes, filed any type of
incident

report,

or

been

otherwise

interviewed

or

contacted

regarding the facts and circumstances of the accident to Catherine
Brown which occurred on January 18, 1994 at Fashion Place Mall in
Murray, Utah.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6.;

With respect to the employees

identified in the preceding interrogatories, identify any employees
who are no longer employed at Chick-Fil-A at the Fashion Place Mall
0

in Murray, Utah.
DATED this

^-r^

day of August, 1996.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys £©JT Plaintiff
By:

/V^t>€>£/

EDWARD T. WELLS
8259-002
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JOHNR LUND(A4368)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALf LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH1

CATHERINE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs
CHRIS GLOVER, d/b/a CHICK-FIL-A,
INC of FASHION PLACE, HAHN
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a California corporation
d/b/a HAHN COMPANY,

DEFENDANT CHRIS GLOVER dba
CHICK-FIL-A'S ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES (dated 8/22/96)

Civil No 950905823 PI
Judae William B Bohling

Defendants

Defendants by and through their counsel of record, John R Lund of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau hereby submits Defendant Chris Glover dba Chick-fil-A's Answers to Plaintiffs First
Set of Interrogatories (dated 8/22/96) as follows
INTERROGATORY NO 1 Identify by name, address and position all persons who
assisted in answering these interrogatories
ANSWER Chris Glover and Defendant's counsel

INTERROGATORY NO 2. Identify by name, address and position those employees
working at Chick-Fil-A on January 18, 1994.
ANSWER: See attached document designated as Exhibit "A."
INTERROGATORY NO 3: Identify by name, address and telephone number the
manager or crew chief who was in charge of the restaurant and on premises on January 18, 1994
between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
ANSWER: The identity of the manager or crew chief who was in charge of the
restaurant on January 18, 1994 is unknown at this time. Refer to Exhibit k'A" for the list of all
employees scheduled to work on January 18, 1994.
INTERROGATORY NO 4: Identify by name, address and telephone number all
employees who distributed samples of chicken in the Fashion Place Mall between the hours of
11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on January 18, 1994.
ANSWER. The identity of the employee who distributed samples of chicken is not
known.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5. Identify by name, address, telephone number and title any
Chick-Fil-A employee who has given any recorded statement, made any written notes, filed any
type of incident report, or been otherwise interviewed or contacted regarding the facts and
circumstances of the accident to Catherine Brown which occurred on January 18, 1994 at
Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah.

-2-

ANSWER: Objection. The information requested in this interrogatory is vague,
ambiguous and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Any
contact made has been done in preparation of trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: With respect to the employees identitied in the preceding
interrogatories, identify any employees who are no longer employed at Chick-Fil-A at the
Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah.
ANSWER: See response to Interrogatory No. 5.
DATED this /;' - _ day of January-, 1997.

N 1 135^ 43 CHICKFIL ANS

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Chris Glover states on oath that the foregoing answers to interrogatories are true and
correct to the best of his knowledge and information and he executes them according to
applicable rules.

EXHIBIT #A
CHICK-FIL-A's EMPLOYEE SCHEDULE OF 1-18-94

MIKE ABEL
JUSTIN ABEL
KARINABEL
DIANA ANCELL
JASON ATTEBURY
IAN CALL
HEATHER FAIRBOURN
HOLLY FAIRBOURN
JON FOLEY
MICHAEL FOLEY
LISA HAYWARD
LANE HIGLEY
MICHELLE KEIRA
JAKE LEIKAM
LAURA LEON
MICHELLE SHELAEH
JENNIE PINBOROUGH
RENITA RAMIREZ
BRADEN ROWLEY
LISA RUBBELKE
BRETT SEAMONS
AMY SWENSON
SOPHIE TURNER
LONDYN WOOD

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Heather Y. Obray, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law offices of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendants herein; that she served the attached
DEFENDANT CHRIS GLOVER dba CfflCK-FEL-A'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST SET OF EVTERROGATORIES (dated 8/22/96) (Case Number 950905823 PI, Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County) upon the parties listed below by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Albert W. Gray, Esq.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3575 South Market Street, #206
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid on this & i^Hday of March,
1997.
(-Relther Y\ OtfiWy

2>Tfry
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this/-T
day of March, 1997.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

